No punt intended: Behind the rise in fourth down attempts — and ‘the book’ that changed the game

Steve Sarkisian loved the position his offense found itself in, so he never blinked.

It was the opening possession of the biggest season opener in college football history. Texas was in plus territory, staring at fourth-and-2 on the right hash mark before a roaring Ohio State crowd of 107,000 fans. 

“My thought and my plan was to go for it. The book reaffirmed to go for it,” Sarkisian said. “I was already in that mode because of the situation in the game and where we were and what hash we were on and what call we had specifically in that moment.  It was pretty easy to go for it in that moment for us.”

Moments later, running back CJ Baxter was stuffed one yard short of a first down. The Buckeyes took possession and the stadium shook. 

Sarkisian had no regrets.

The Texas coach’s gut was reinforced by analytics — boiled into a 63-page binder that a Texas staffer lugs along the sideline every Saturday. Coaches call it “the book,” a rainbow of charts dictating whether to punt, kick or gamble.

“It’s changing college football dramatically,” Oklahoma coach Brent Venables said.

The use of analytics has exploded in he last five years in college sports. Unsurprisingly, fourth-down attempts and conversions have soared. Coaches have never been more aggressive. 

Week 0/1 this season alone set a new record with 377 fourth-down tries across the FBS, according to data provided to CBS Sports by CollegeFootballData.com. Teams converted 54.3% of those attempts into first downs — the best opening-week mark since 2021 and a nearly 4% increase from last season’s opening weeks.

The shift traces back to “the book,” football’s analytical bible. Its creator, Michael McRoberts, is a statistician and was once a credit bureau consultant tinkering with Excel in the early 2010s. Frustrated as he watched a coach’s decision to punt, he ran the numbers in a spreadsheet and confirmed his hunch: the math didn’t match the decision.

“One thing led to another and I realized a lot of people were talking about these type of things but there didn’t seem to be any tools that coaches could use in real time,” McRoberts said

Championship Analytics was born out of frustration and the creation of the fourth-down tome. “The book” is filled with page after page of color-coded boxes, corresponding with first-down markers on yard lines. It’s a simple product to decipher: a green box means go, and red warns to punt or kick. Simple, but revolutionary.

McRoberts pitched the system to NFL and college teams in 2013, but few initially took him seriously until Troy agreed to become CAI’s first client. They compensated him with team gear, tickets and a signed football that still sits in his office. The Trojans’ success opened doors, and soon college and NFL teams were calling. Today, CAI consults 104 of 136 FBS programs.

“Seeing their peers make some of the (fourth-down) choices that went against them opened the door for that to be a possibility for them,” McRoberts said. “It’s all a psychological battle.”

The information has proven positive for most teams. Since 2016, fourth-down conversions are up nearly 30%. Last season saw a record 1,626 conversion attempts, with offenses staying on the field on 25.4% of fourth downs — the highest rate in history.

But the binder isn’t gospel. After all, no number can properly factor in momentum, weather conditions and on-the-fly personnel changes. 

“I learned a pretty good lesson this weekend,” said LSU coach Brian Kelly, “Analytics also have to factor in time on the clock and the amount of possessions or chances (to score) that you would have. I know I made a mistake in going for it on the fourth-down situation where we should have settled for a field goal before the half.”

Down 10-3, LSU faced fourth-and-2 at Clemson’s 12-yard line with 15 seconds remaining before halftime. With one timeout remaining, Kelly sought the book’s guidance. Picking up a first down would allow enough time for LSU to potentially run four more plays to score a touchdown and tie the game. 

But LSU fell short of the first down when senior receiver Chris Hilton fumbled a pass from Garrett Nussmeier.

Kelly said he made the wrong decision and should have kicked a field goal.

“Just to give you an example” continued Kelly, “it was a ‘go’ for us in the fourth quarter when we punted from the 40-yard line. It’s good to have that information, but I still think you have to be intuitive as a coach that’s in real time and making those decisions.”

Arkansas coach Sam Pittman has shifted away from analytics in recent years, after relying heavily on the CAI Game Book in 2022. The Razorbacks struggled to convert fourth downs, ranking 91st nationally at 45%, so he placed the book back on the shelf. The program has since converted more than 60% of their fourth downs every year. 

The binder remains available on the sideline, where tight ends coach Morgan Turner holds the analytical answers, but it’s not referenced often.

“If I decide to ask for it, he’s readily available to tell me but I told him: don’t tell me unless I ask,” Pittman said. “Because, again, it’s more of a feel for me right now like it was my first two years than what the book says.”

Missouri coach Eli Drinkwitz is more aggressive on fourth downs during the first three quarters of games, when he believes points should be chased, but he also doesn’t rely on analytics.

“They pay me to make the decisions, not defer to a book,” he said.

Other prominent coaches have followed different paths on the roads painted by numbers. North Carolina coach Bill Belichick opted this season to continue using a system developed previously by a former New England Patriots staffer, sources told CBS Sports.

Week 1 featured a bevy of crucial fourth-down attempts in big games. In a battle of titans, Ohio State and Texas combined for three attempts on the first two possessions.

Alabama’s offense remained on the field for five fourth downs in its 31-17 loss at Florida State on Saturday. The Tide converted only two, though their first conversion kept a game-opening, 17-play touchdown drive alive. 

Tide coach Kalen DeBoer rarely deviates from the book’s recommendations.

“There’s a clear understanding you have to be committed to it,” he said. “If you’re going to use it, you have to commit to what the analytics really are. It makes complete sense to me, but there’s still a piece when you have weather, wind, maybe a personnel piece that impacts how the game is going. You’ve got to take all those things into consideration. That’s what I’ve done. Honestly, when the game is in limbo or you’re playing from behind, I feel like the chances we’ve taken have certainly paid off.”

Auburn coach Hugh Freeze overruled the charts against Baylor with a game-sealing fourth-down call, ignoring the recommendation for a field goal with the Tigers leading Baylor 31-24 on the road. The gamble paid off and quarterback Jackson Arnold shot through the middle of the defense untouched for a 27-yard touchdown run with 4:32 remaining. Auburn won 38-24.

“We’d been running the ball so well, so you kinda say we have a chance to put this game away with a first down,” said Freeze, whose Tigers finished with 307 rushing yards. “So I still kinda go with my gut. I’m definitely more aggressive than I used to be.” 

The ripple effects are everywhere. Florida Atlantic led the nation with nine fourth-down attempts in its opener against Maryland last week. 

“We use the CAI book, but we won’t always be 100% on it. We were 100% on it last week,” FAU coach Zach Kittley said. “Mainly because we were trailing, but we were going to be ultra-aggressive on the road against a [power conference] school.”

Said McRoberts: “If you want to hold onto hope for winning, you need to steal possessions. A lot of it is introducing variances into the game.”

Riverboat gamblers

The book has helped loosen the binds on old-school coaches, breaking free from preconceived notions and paving the way for more aggressive decisions.

“Back in the day,” said Ole Miss coach Lane Kiffin, “riverboat gamblers is what they used to call them.”

Now, gambling isn’t heresy if the book approves.

Twenty years ago, only one team (Toledo) converted 20-plus fourth downs in a season. Last year, 13 did. Seven programs have topped 30 since 2017.

It’s no coincidence the CAI Game Book has become part of the football lexicon during that time. Analytics have made the inconceivable seem ordinary.

In Week 1, Rutgers converted all five of its fourth-down attempts, including a fourth-and-7 in field-goal range with 1:54 remaining in a three-point game. The book directed the Scarlet Knights to keep the offense on the field. A decade ago, coaches may have opted for the field goal. The conversion iced the 34-31 win against Ohio. Had Rutgers instead kicked the field goal, Ohio would have had an opportunity to tie or win the game with one timeout remaining.

The book’s go-or-kick metrics are not static and change considerably with less than four minutes remaining, McRoberts said.

McRoberts said the hardest sell remains inside the 5-yard line, where many coaches still choose field goals over 50-50 odds. Coaches have grown more comfortable going for it on fourth-and-goal at the 2-yard line, but beyond that marker, it becomes a dicier decision for coaches despite the book suggesting otherwise.

“Fourth-and-goal from the 3 and 4 are often ones that are recommended that coaches aren’t too keen on trying, because it might be less than a 50-50 prop,” McRoberts said. “It’s hard to get them to pull the trigger. If you miss, the opponent will start on the 3, which has a ton of value. It’s still kinda tough to get coaches on board with that after a long drive and to have nothing more than 50-50 shot of walking away empty.”

The analytics haven’t changed much year to year since McRoberts’ system was developed in 2013, and yet conversion numbers climb higher.

“If nothing else, it leads to a lot of good discussion in football offices about strategy,” McRoberts said.

A decade ago, going for it on fourth down made a coach a gambler. Today, it makes him a disciple. The book has turned risk into routine, and college football may never go back.